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Abstract
This paper argues that Russia’s choice of economic organization, which is based on 
the renewed role of the state, is a response to the existence of severe transaction costs, and 
subsequent mitigation of contractual incompleteness in the absence of a strong proper ty 
ULJKWVV\VWHP,OOGH¿QHGSURSHUW\ULJKWVKDYHKLVWRULFDOO\KDPSHUHGIRUPDWLRQRIEXVL-
ness classes in Russia, reducing the necessity for appropriate market infrastructure. This 
also implied that if Russia’s political and economic system had more than one compet-
ing hierarchy, the objective of the elites would not have entailed long-term economic 
growth, as gains from short-term wealth tunneling would have been much larger. As in 
WKHHDUO\V5XVVLDQLQYHVWPHQWSURMHFWVZHUHJHQHUDOO\GH¿QHGE\ODUJHVXQNFRVWV
and long-term to maturity, under a weak legal system a new substitute governing mecha-
nism, which took form of the state–private co-partnership system, has arisen in order to 
reduce hold-up costs leading to high levels of underinvestment. 
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
reserved.
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ P21, P26, P37
.H\ZRUGV state corporatism, industry growth, property rights, Russia.
1. Introduction
A sharp turnaround in laissez-faire policies of the 1990s under the new regime 
in the beginning of the new millennium resulted in a renewed political control 
RI WKHFHQWUDO VWDWH7KHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ SRZHU RI UHJLRQDO RI¿FHVZDV WUDQV-
IHUUHG EDFN WR WKHIHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW XQGHU WKH³YHUWLFDO ÀRZRI SRZHU´ UXOH
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%DKU\7RPSVRQZKLOHSROLWLFDO LQÀXHQFHRI WKHTXDVLPDQDJHU
RZQHUJURXSDOVRNQRZQDVWKHROLJDUFKVZDVVLJQL¿FDQWO\FXUEHG*ROGPDQ
2003). Recently emerged political party competition, which thrived under Putin’s 
predecessor’s administration, was reduced to a handful of participants, where 
the central government’s party, United Russia, secured an overwhelmingly domi-
QDQWSRVLWLRQ*HO¶PDQ5HXWHUDQG5HPLQJWRQ
One of the most noteworthy effects of the strengthened role of the central state 
was its renewed governing presence in major Russian corporations (Chernykh, 
 9DQWHHYD DQG +LFNVRQ  +RZHYHU WKHLGHD RI ³5XVVLDQ VWDWH
FRUSRUDWLVP´DGHYHORSPHQWRIWHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWK WKHQHZSROLWLFDO UHJLPHRI
WKHV /DQH +DQVRQ DQG7HDJXH  FDQ EH SHUVLVWHQWO\ IRXQG
throughout Russia’s long-standing tradition of autocratic rule. For example, 
*HUVFKHQNURQ¶VFDWFKXSWKHRU\VWUHVVHVWKHLPSRUWDQWUROHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQ
channelling investment funds to targeted industries towards the end of the 19th 
to early 20th century, when tsarist Russia exhibited a higher degree of economic 
EDFNZDUGQHVV FRPSDUHG WR WKDW RI LWV (XURSHDQ FRXQWHUSDUWV *HUVFKHQNURQ
1962). In the absence of vital prerequisites, such as advancement of technology, 
VNLOOHGODERUDQGDYDLODELOLW\RIGRPHVWLFFDSLWDOWKHQHZ¿QDQFHPLQLVWHU6HUJHL
Witte, advocated a policy which focused on direct state intervention (Willis, 
7RPSNLQV'UXPPRQG*DWUHOO
More recently, one can observe the degree of state involvement in Russia’s econo-
my during the last century summarized in Table 1. In period 1 the otherwise revo-
OXWLRQDU\6RYLHWUHJLPHDGRSWHGDFHQWUDOL]HGVWDWHHFRQRP\WKURXJKLWVVXFFHVVLYH
¿YH\HDUSODQ RUJDQL]LQJ WKHHFRQRP\RQ D VWULFW KLHUDUFKDO V\VWHP DEROLVKLQJ
private property and introducing central planning (Ericson, 1991). The strategy 
was somewhat successful in promoting capital and total factor productivity growth 
WKHODWWHUKDYLQJDQDYHUDJHJURZWKUDWHRIRYHUWKH±SHULRG1), until 
WKH¿QDOSKDVHRIWKHUHJLPHZLWQHVVHGSURGXFWVKRUWDJHVDWWULEXWDEOHWRPDQDJHULDO
DQGORFDOEXUHDXFUDWLFFRUUXSWLRQ.UDPHU
The perestroika (period 2) experimented with market-oriented policies, in order 
WRUHGXFH LQHI¿FLHQFLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFHQWUDOSODQQLQJ WKXVDOORFDWLQJGLVFUH-
WLRQDU\GHFLVLRQPDNLQJSRZHUWRUHJLRQDORI¿FLDOV7KHJRYHUQPHQWDOVRKRSHG
WRJHQHUDWHDQLQFLSLHQWSULYDWHO\RZQHGVHFWRU,QWKH/DZRQ&RRSHUDWLYHV
allowed private ownership in non-strategic economic sectors such as services, 
PDQXIDFWXULQJDQGIRUHLJQWUDGHEXWWKHH[SHFWHGLQFUHDVHLQSULYDWH¿UPIRUPD-
tion proved unsuccessful due to the predatory behavior of local bureaucrats. As is 
JHQHUDOO\NQRZQ0LNKDLO*RUEDFKHY¶VLQLWLDWLYHVOHGWRHFRQRPLFGLVDVWHUGXHWR
WKHORVVRIFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWFRQWURORYHUHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQV%RHWWNH
7KHSULYDWL]DWLRQSURJUDPLQWURGXFHGXQGHU%RULV<HOWVLQSHULRGUHVXOWHG
in the de facto ownership of shares by former state enterprise insiders (Alexeev, 
)LODWRWFKHYHWDO%ODFNHWDOZKRZHUHDEOHWRWUDGHDQGOL
TXLGDWH¿UPV¶DVVHWV7KHSHULRGZDVWKXVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\H[WHQVLYHZHDOWKGLYHU-
VLRQWKURXJKDVVHWVWULSSLQJOHDGLQJWRGLVLQYHVWPHQWDQGXOWLPDWHFDSLWDOÀLJKW
 1 7KHPDWXUH 6RYLHW FHQWUDOVWDWH V\VWHP EHWZHHQ  DQG PDQGDWHG WKHPL[ DQG TXDQWLW\ RI DOO
PDQXIDFWXUHGJRRGVDQGDOORXWSXWZDVDOORFDWHGE\¿DWZKHQWKHVWDWHZDVGLUHFWLQJWKHDYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHVWR
where it considered they were most needed (as predicted by Trotsky, 1925). The regime also set all managerial 
salaries (Leeman, 1963).
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UHVXOWLQJLQDGUDPDWLFIDOOLQSURGXFWLRQ6WLJOLW]+RIIDQG6WLJOLW]
Ross, 2004). In the 1990s, the regions also gained de facto power and the peri-
od saw the emergence of regional bureaucrats (Robinson, 2002). They exploited 
the existing regional differences in new policy proposals, such as public spending, 
DVZHOODVDVVLJQHGUHJLRQ³SURSHUW\ULJKWV´LQPDQ\HQWHUSULVHVWRSXUVXHWKHLU
own wealth tunneling objectives. At the same time, shock therapy led to hyperin-
ÀDWLRQDQGZLSHGRXWVDYLQJVRIWKH5XVVLDQFLWL]HQU\OHDGLQJWRH[WUHPHSRYHUW\
DQGSROLWLFDOLQVWDELOLW\)UHHODQG+RIIPDQ/LEPDQDQG)HOG
$V5XVVLD¶VEULHÀ\DGRSWHGPDUNHWUHIRUPVZHUHVKRUWOLYHGGXHWRWKHLUIDLO-
ure to generate economic growth, it was unsurprising for the incoming politi-
FDOUHJLPHSHULRGWRUHLQWURGXFHDVLJQL¿FDQWUROHIRUWKHVWDWHLQGLUHFWLQJ
WKHHFRQRP\2OLJDUFKV¶ZHDOWKGLYHUVLRQSUDFWLFHVZHUHGLPLQLVKHG*ROGPDQ
7RPSVRQZKLOHUHJLRQDORI¿FLDOV¶RSSRUWXQLVWLFEHKDYLRUZDVDOVR
UHVWUDLQHG*ROGPDQ*UHJRU\DQG6FKUHWWO%DKU\'LQLQLR
DQG2UWWXQJ,YDQHQNR,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHQHZSROLFLHVGLGQRWFRP-
pletely abolish the free market approach in that all prices and output quanti-
ties, except that in a few strategic industries, were allowed to be determined by 
WKHPDUNHW+RZHYHUDQLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRIWKHQHZUHJLPHZDVWKDWWKHVWDWH
UHHQJDJHGGLUHFWO\ZLWK5XVVLD¶VPDLQLQGXVWULHV%RXVVHQDDQG/RFDWHOOL
.DO\X]KQRYDDQG1\JDDUGEXWLQVWHDGRISXUVXLQJWKHUHQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ
initiative, it opted to form co-partnerships with private  investors. 
7KLVSDSHUH[DPLQHVWKHPHFKDQLVPVHPSOR\HGGXULQJ3XWLQ¶V¿UVWWHQXUH
to restore the state’s governing status, while also promoting a certain degree 
RI SULFH GLVFRYHU\ FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG SULYDWH RZQHUVKLS 6HFWLRQ  DOOXGHV
to the motivation behind government’s continuous intervention in Russian 
Table 1
7KHUROHRIWKHFHQWUDOVWDWHLQWKHHFRQRP\DQGFRUUHVSRQGLQJHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHGXULQJ²
Regime 'HJUHHRIFHQWUDOVWDWH
control in corporations
Major corporate  
ownership and residual 
FODLPVWRSUR¿W
Economic  
performance
± 
6RYLHW8QLRQ 
*RVSODQ 
(1)
Mandated: input and output 
SULFHVLQYHVWPHQWDQG
output targets
None 2 periods: 
± 
*13JURZWKUDWHLV 
± 
*13JURZWKUDWHLV
± 
Perestroika  
(2)
%LQGLQJRXWSXWTXRWDVRQ
enterprises. Imposed under 
market-clearing prices on 
critical products
None *13JURZWK§
(total factor productivity 
is negative)
1991–2000  
<HOWVLQ¶VWHQXUH 
(3)
%LQGLQJRXWSXWTXRWDVRQ
VWDWHHQWHUSULVHV%LQGLQJ
under market-clearing 
prices on critical products
Quasi-managerial 
RZQHUVKLS6XUUHSWLWLRXV
VKDUHWUDGLQJDQG¿UP
asset trading 
*'3GHFOLQHVE\
(industry and agricultural 
sectors decreases by 
more than twice)
± 
3XWLQ¶V¿UVWWHQXUH
(4)
%LQGLQJRXWSXWTXRWDVRQ
VWDWHHQWHUSULVHV%LQGLQJ
under market-clearing 
prices on critical products
Residual outside-investor 
ownership. Firm asset 
trading
*'3JURZWK 
(productivity growth 
LV
6RXUFH (FRQRPLF SHUIRUPDQFH GDWD LV IURP .XUW]ZHJ  SS ± 1RUHQ DQG .XUW]ZHJ 
SS±DQG.XGULQDQG*XUYLFK
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econo my, highlighting its inability to create a suitable environment for a free 
PDUNHW6HFWLRQRXWOLQHVWZRSROLFLHVDGRSWHGE\WKHVWDWHLQWKHHDUO\V
in order to accomplish its self-professed goal of long-term growth. One poli-
F\FRQVLVWHGLQLQWURGXFLQJD³SXQLVKPHQW´VWUDWHJ\ZKLFKZDVLPSOHPHQWHG
ZKHQSULYDWHGHFLVLRQPDNHUVVXFKDV¿UPPDQDJHUVRUORZHUOHYHOEXUHDX-
crats, engaged in predatory behavior. The second policy focused on introduc-
ing a co-partnership system between the state and private investors. I argue 
WKDWWKHVHFRQGSROLF\ZDVOLNHO\WREHIDYRUHGLIWKH³SXQLVKPHQW´VWUDWHJ\LQ
LWVHOIZDVQRWVXI¿FLHQWDQGWRRFRVWO\DVLQWKHFDVHRIGLYHUWHGODUJHOXPS
sum investment funds in the natural resources sectors, which resulted in inter-
QDWLRQDOVFDQGDOVDQGORVVRIIXWXUHLQYHVWPHQW)LQDOO\6HFWLRQFRQFOXGHV
2. State intervention and corporate growth
2.1. The role of institutions
7KHUROHRIWKHVWDWHLQWKHHFRQRP\KDVEHHQDWRSLFRIJUHDWLQWHUHVW6RPH
IROORZ WKH+REEHVLDQ YLHZ DQG WUXVW WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI WKHVWDWH WR SOD\ DQ
active part, creating supporting institutions and providing effective regulation. 
Others adopt Locke’s approach and consider government interference to be harm-
IXOLQWKDWLWUHGXFHVHFRQRPLFHI¿FLHQF\DFKLHYHGE\SULYDWHSOD\HUVZKRFDOO
for a natural evolution of property rights. In this paper, I argue that the function of 
the state is highly dependent on the country’s entrenched customs and traditions, 
political rule, and subsequently, its legal developments.
For instance, one of the most widely accepted arguments against state’s involve-
ment in economic affairs is that delegation of power to the government is often 
not matched by its credible commitments to other players. In their famous work, 
1RUWKDQG:HLQJDVW SURYLGHDQH[DPSOHRIth century England, where 
the revenue-seeking Crown continually dishonored its contractual conformities, 
and was subsequently stripped of its monopoly decision-making power to allocate 
funds. The ruling power of the Crown was replaced by political institutions, which 
enforced ex post contractual agreements. The new redistribution of control resulted 
in the emergence of greater political and civil freedom, as well as the ability of 
the sovereign to credibly commit to protecting private property rights. The success 
of these new institutions is linked to England’s economic  development.
<HWDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHDXWKRUVSRLQWRXWWKDWWKHUHIRUPVGLGQRWDULVHQD
WXUDOO\²LWLVXQOLNHO\WKDWWKHSUHVHQWJRYHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVLQ(QJODQGZRXOG
exist had the Crown had an army to suppress the opposition. More importantly, 
the new hierarchies (the Parliament, the Whigs, etc.) did not operate in a country 
ZLWKRXWD²DOWKRXJKVRPHZKDWZHDN²OHJDOV\VWHP0DJQD&DUWDDQ(QJOLVK
legal charter, which was originally issued in 1215, revealed certain individual 
rights which were bounded by law.
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or 
Liberties, or the free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise de-
stroyed… We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either 
Justice or Right.
(Clause 29, Magna Carta 1215)
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In other words, the concept of private property rights was not unfamiliar to 
(QJODQG EHIRUH WKH*ORULRXV 5HYROXWLRQ (FRQRPLF DJHQWV LGHQWL¿HG VXEVWDQ-
tial gains to be made from long-term commitment, and wealth expropriation by 
the Crown was seen as a hindrance to achieving economic prosperity. 
6LPLODUO\:HLQJDVWDWWULEXWHGWKHVXFFHVVRIWKH86FRPPRQPDUNHW
characterized by strong protection of property rights, to the federalism system, 
which allowed the states to have the power to supply their citizens with public 
JRRGVEXWOLPLWLQJWKHVHSRZHUVWRDSDUWLFXODUUHJLRQ+RZHYHUWKHDXWKRUVWDWHV
that such restrictions were made credible by a combination of formal institutions 
and informal norms that regulated the behavior of economic agents.
Market-preserving federalism was the product of a historical process result-
ing in a strong consensus supporting these limits…and rested on the fact that 
the vast majority of the population consistently favored policies and parties 
limiting the federal government and protecting economic rights. 
(Weingast, 1995, p. 26) 
%\H[DPLQLQJ WKHLQQRYDWLRQV WKDW IRFXVHGRQ ORZHULQJ WUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV LQ
mercantile early modern Europe, North (1991) drew attention to the evolution 
RIFDSLWDOPDUNHWVDQLPSRUWDQWFRPSRQHQWRIZKLFKZDVZHOOGH¿QHGSURSHUW\
rights, facilitating trade and investment. North believed that the increasing en-
forceability of contracts, a process which was aided by an improving legal sys-
WHPZDVWKHSURGXFWRI³WKHORQJHYROXWLRQRIPHUFKDQWODZIURPLWVYROXQWDU\
beginnings and the differences in resolutions that it had with both the common 
DQGWKH5RPDQODZDUHDSDUWRIWKHVWRU\´1RUWKS
+RZHYHU QRW DOO FRXQWULHV IROORZHG LQVWLWXWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQW FRXUVH RI
(QJODQG WKH86DQG(XURSH5XVVLD¶VSROLWLFDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO HYROXWLRQFDQ
be contrasted to that of the above. In Russia, traditional authoritarian rule conti-
nuously impeded the development of a strong legal system.
Lawyers! What is the use of so many? I have only two in my whole empire, 
and I mean to hang one of them as soon as I return.
3HWHUWKH*UHDWRQKLVWUDYHOVWR/RQGRQLQ 
4XRWHGLQ6PLWKS
,OOGH¿QHG SURSHUW\ ULJKWV KDPSHUHG WKHIRUPDWLRQ RI EXVLQHVV VWUDWD LQ
Russia, reducing the necessity for appropriate market infrastructure. The per-
sistent absence of the necessary prerequisites for a market economy also im-
plied that if Russia’s political and economic system had more than one compet-
ing hierarchy, such as truculent members of the lower classes of bureaucracy, 
the objective of the elites would not have entailed long-term economic growth, 
for the gains from short-term wealth siphoning would have been much larger. 
Indeed, for early as the mid-16th century, the ruling dynasty believed that the oli-
garchy was undermining Russia’s economic progress, subsequently implement-
LQJDQH[WUHPHO\DXWRFUDWLFUHJLPH<DQRY/DWHUXQGHUWKH³HQOLJKWHQ
HG´3HWHU WKH*UHDW WKHFHQWUDOL]HGDXWKRULWDULDQLVPGLUHFWHG5XVVLDQLQGXVWU\
WR³ZHVWHUQL]H´3LSHV2QHRI3HWHU¶VUDWLRQDOHVIRUFHQWUDOO\GLUHFWLQJ
KLV³PRGHUQL]DWLRQ´ZDVKLVQHHGWRRYHUFRPHWKHWUXFXOHQFHRIPDQ\PHPEHUV
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of the lower state bureaucracy, many of whom were known as boyars (Raeff, 
1962). The latter remained locked in protecting their feudal privileges, and there-
fore opposed the introduction of western-style, commercially dominated cities, 
while suspecting that new economic reforms were incompatible with the sur-
vival of the old empire. The tradition of centrally imposing commercial revolu-
WLRQVZDVUHDI¿UPHGGXULQJWKHUHLJQRI1LFKRODV,,DWWKHHQGRIWKHQLQHWHHQWK
FHQWXU\ZKHQWKH6WRO\SLQDQG:LWWHUHIRUPVVHUYHGWRVSDUN5XVVLD¶VLQFLSLHQW
industrialization. Once again, modernizing reforms were rigorously opposed by 
WKHRYHUZKHOPLQJPDVVRI WKHFRQVHUYDWLYHEXUHDXFUDF\RI WKHSHULRG+RO]HU
and Illiash, 2009).
6LPLODUO\5XVVLDQSULYDWL]DWLRQSURFHVVFDQEHGHVFULEHGDVDUHFHQWH[DPSOH
of several competing hierarchies operating in an environment without clearly-
GH¿QHGSURSHUW\ULJKWVZKHUHSULYDWHHFRQRPLFDJHQWVEHFDPHIUHHWRDFTXLUH
VWDWH¶VDVVHWVZLWKRXWDQ\UHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUN6WLJOLW]$VSUHYLRXVO\
PHQWLRQHGVHYHUDOHOLWHJURXSVVXFKDVQHZ³EXVLQHVVPHQ´RUROLJDUFKVDQG
UHJLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVZHUHIRUPHGDQGWKH\GLGQRW¿QGLWSUR¿WDEOHWR
make long-term commitments and invest into their corporations. In the absence 
of supporting institutions, it was far more lucrative to engage in asset-stripping 
%ODFNHWDO6RQLQ(DFKRIWKHKLHUDUFKLHVKDYLQJDWWDLQHGFRQ-
siderable political and economic power, competed rigorously with each other for 
resources, eroding the nation’s wealth at an even faster rate (for example, Ponzi 
VFKHPHVFDUULHGRXWE\WKHQHZO\IRUPHG5XVVLDQEDQNVVHH3LVWRUDQG6SLFHU
/DHYHQ  ,W LV WKHUHIRUH XQVXUSULVLQJ WKDW WKH3XWLQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
UHYHUWHGEDFNWRWKHWUDGLWLRQDO³WRSGRZQ´FRQWUROVWUDWHJ\DQGIRUFHGROLJDUFK
TXDVLRZQHUVDQGUHJLRQDOEXUHDXFUDWVWRJLYHXSWKHLUSRZHU*ROGPDQ
Tompson, 2005). 
2.2. The political regime of the 2000s
With Vladimir Putin coming to power, the central government focused on 
WDNLQJFRQWURORIWKHFRPPDQGLQJKHLJKWV7KH³GD\RIWKHROLJDUFKV´ZDVWUXO\
RYHUDQGUHJLRQDORI¿FLDOVQRORQJHUFRQWUROOHGSDUWVRI5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\$Q\
remaining 1990s business elites were expected to fully cooperate with the state’s 
economic objectives and assist in Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy ini-
tiatives (Aris and Marshall, 2004). At that time, many scholars drew attention 
to the rise of the new elite. Siloviki, who were seen as Putin’s trusted men and 
represented security service and law enforcement veterans, became the pillar of 
the new administration. They were placed on company boards, particularly in 
industries of national importance, in order to enforce the regime’s policies and 
to safeguard company assets. In contrast to the oligarchs, siloviki exercised their 
power through managerial positions rather than ownership. They saw their role 
as to reverse problems created by the oligarchs, reintroduce hierarchical loyal-
W\DQGDERYHDOOSURWHFWQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV7UHLVPDQ6LPLODUO\WUXVWHG
JRYHUQPHQWRI¿FHUVZHUHSXWLQFKDUJHRIWKHVHYHQ³VXSHUUHJLRQV´ZKLFKZHUH
FUHDWHGWRUHYHUVHWKHOHDNDJHRISRZHUWRUHJLRQDOEXUHDXFUDWV5XWODQG
2UWWXQJ+DVKLP
This paper adopts the view that silovikiGLGQRWUHSUHVHQWDVHSDUDWHHOLWH²WKH\
merely served as a conduit for the central government, through which the new 
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policies were channelled. In addition, I highlight the fact that although after 
a brief experiment with laissez-faire policies Russia was once again drawn to 
its long-standing tradition of authoritarian rule, the new regime did not revert 
EDFN WR VWDWHFRQWUROOHGHFRQRP\ LQVWHDG WKHJRYHUQPHQW DVSLUHG WREHFRPH
an effective partner with private investors. It aimed to promote long-run eco-
QRPLFJURZWKZKLFKZDV WREH¿QDQFHG WKURXJKDPL[WXUHRIVWDWHVXEVLGLHV
and private investment funds. The government recognized that in the absence of 
HI¿FLHQW:HVWHUQW\SHLQVWLWXWLRQVLQYHVWRUVIDFHGVLJQL¿FDQWWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV
that would result in underinvestment, if the state did not introduce some effec-
tive substitute. 
The next section introduces two related hypotheses. First, it is proposed that 
given a persistently weak legal environment, the central state did not allow com-
SHWLQJKLHUDUFKLHVWRH[HUWLQÀXHQFHRQWKHHFRQRP\DQGLWLPSOHPHQWHGLWVVWUDW-
HJ\E\SRVLWLRQLQJLWVHOIDVWKHOHDGHULQD6WDFNHOEHUJJDPHZKHUHE\LWSURPRW-
ed corporate growth by encouraging private agents’ operations through a com-
bination of free-market and state-mandated policies, but also induced severe 
SXQLVKPHQWIRUFRQWUDFWXDOQRQFRPSOLDQFH7KH6WDFNHOEHUJPRGHOVKRZVWKDW
WKHLQFRPLQJUHJLPHGLGQRWDLPWRUHEXLOGROG6RYLHWLQVWLWXWLRQVEXWIRFXVHG
on restoring order and protecting national economy from the elites’ concentrated 
economic and political power. 
6HFRQG DV VXFK JDPHVZHUHPRUH FRVWO\ DFURVV LQGXVWULHVZLWK ODUJH VXQN
FRVWVDQGKLJKDVVHWVSHFL¿FLW\ZKHUH¿UPVZHUHQRWRQO\FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\KLJK
hold-up costs, but also bigger international scandals, the state chose to form 
state-private co-partnership systems with private investors. In this partnership, 
WKHVWDWHSOD\HGDPDMRUUROH LQ¿UPFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHDQGFRXOG WKHUHIRUH
avert rent-seeking behavior from the outset, thus minimizing misappropriation 
RIERWKJRYHUQPHQWDQGSULYDWHLQYHVWRUV´IXQGVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIZHOOGH¿QHG
property rights. 
3. The punishment strategy and the state-private co-partnership system
3.1. The Stackelberg game between the central state and private  
 decision-makers 
This section outlines a model adopted by the central state in order to enforce 
contractual compliance of private decision-makers. The model can discourage 
short-term rent-seeking behavior by allowing the state to execute punishment if 
a decision-maker chooses to pursue wealth tunneling objectives. It is argued that 
the model was developed in response to the legacy of previous regime’s reforms, 
which empowered the rising elite to take advantage of an open but weak political 
system and use their ill-gotten wealth to buy media coverage, as well as state of-
¿FLDOVLQRUGHUWRIXUWKHUWKHLULQWHUHVWVDQGWRVWULSWKHQDWLRQ¶VDVVHWV
7KHVWDWHZKLFKDFWVDVWKH6WDFNHOEHUJOHDGHUSDVVHVODZVWKDWDGGUHVVSUR-
tection of investment funds. It knows that, due to a poor legal system, the laws 
may not be effectively enforced. The government also acknowledges that a pri-
YDWH GHFLVLRQPDNHU IRU H[DPSOH ¿UPPDQDJHU FDQ EH QRQFRRSHUDWLYH DQG
ignore the law if the expected return from short-term wealth tunneling is higher 
than that from a long-term investment commitment strategy. Therefore, the state 
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develops a punishment strategy, which it imposes on private decision-makers if 
they do not conform to the implemented policy. If the penalty is severe, it is in 
the best interests of a private decision-maker to conform. 
)LJVKRZVWKHVWDWHDFWLQJDVWKH6WDFNHOEHUJOHDGHU7KHPD[LPXPSD\RII
the state can achieve is represented by ʌ, while the corresponding payoff to a pri-
vate decision-maker is (1– s)ʌ/n+RZHYHUʌ is also unattainable, as it can only 
be accomplished by not inducing a punishment mechanism, with private agents 
still credibly committing to honor their contractual obligations and not adopt-
LQJVKRUWWHUPLQYHVWRUH[SURSULDWLRQVWUDWHJ\+RZHYHURQHFDQVHHWKDWJLYHQ
WKHQRSHQDOW\RSWLRQ DJHQWV FDQREWDLQD ODUJHUSUR¿WRIm ((1– s)ʌ /n), where 
m FRUUHVSRQGVWRDSRVLWLYHFRHI¿FLHQWREWDLQHGE\QRWFRQIRUPLQJWRWKHVWDWH¶V
SROLF\DQGFKHDWLQJOHDYLQJWKHVWDWHZLWKDVPDOOHUSUR¿WRIĮʌ. The state an-
ticipates such opportunistic behavior, and introduces a punishment strategy at 
cost c in the initial period. The cost of punishment leaves the state with a reduced 
SUR¿WRIʌ– c, yet one can see that the outcome ʌ– c, ((1– s)(ʌ– c)) /n is the only 
HTXLOLEULXPLQWKLVJDPHEHFDXVHE\FKRRVLQJWKH³QRWWRFRQIRUP´RSWLRQZLWK
a punishment strategy already in place, private agents will create an even smaller 
SUR¿WIRUWKHPVHOYHVDVZHOODVWKHVWDWH
Perhaps the most apparent example of this game was the prosecution of the head 
RI<XNRVRLOFRPSDQ\0LNKDLO.KRGRUNRYVN\,QWKHULFKHVWROLJDUFKZDV
accused of engaging in extensive asset-stripping, as well as using his position to 
bribe local bureaucrats. The federal government placed Khodorkovsky under ar-
UHVWIRUWD[HYDVLRQDQG<XNRVDVVHWVZHUHVXEVHTXHQWO\VROGWRWKHVWDWHRZQHG
FRPSDQ\5RVQHIW%\H[HFXWLQJVXFKSXQLVKPHQWWKHVWDWHVHQWDFOHDUPHVVDJH
that Kremlin will not be challenged by the elite, who became accustomed to fus-
ing their political and economic power (practice that western institutions vetoed 
since the 1920s). Other oligarchs, who were subjected to similar fate included 
Fig. 1.7KHVWDWHDFWVDVWKH6WDFNHOEHUJOHDGHULQDWZRSOD\HUJDPH 
between the state and a private decision-maker
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%RULV%HUH]RYVN\ZKRLQLWLDOO\PDGHJDLQVIURPFKDQQHOOLQJPRQH\IURPDPR-
WRUFRPSDQ\/RJRYD]LQWKHVDQGODWHUVHWKLVLQWHUHVWVRQ$HURÀRW6LEQHIW
and Russian Public Television. In an attempt to cement his power over the Russian 
HFRQRP\%HUH]RYVN\DOVRH[SUHVVHGNHHQLQWHUHVWLQSROLWLFVZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQ
KLVH[LOHWR/RQGRQLQ9ODGLPLU*XVLQVN\ZKRVXFFHVVIXOO\FUHDWHGDPH-
GLDHPSLUHDQGXVHGKLVSRVLWLRQ WR LQÀXHQFHSROLWLFV LQRUGHU WRXVXUSIXUWKHU
ZHDOWKDOVRIRXQGKLPVHOILQH[LOH6DNZD7KHSXQLVKPHQWVWUDWHJ\VLJ-
nalled that the only way for the oligarchs to participate in economic transactions 
ZDVWRDFFHSWWKHJRYHUQPHQWDVWKH6WDFNHOEHUJOHDGHUZKRLQHYLWDEO\GLFWDWHG
the rules of the game. Evidence suggests that Kremlin allowed several oligarchs 
to maintain their empires as long as their behavior did not disrupt the state’s 
VWUDWHJ\*ROGPDQ)RUH[DPSOH2OHJ'HULSDVND9ODGLPLU3RWDQLQDQG
Roman Abramovich still controlled metal mining empires, but they had to adhere 
to certain conditions imposed by the state (such as Abramovich selling his major 
RZQHUVKLSVWDNHRIRLOFRPSDQ\6LEQHIWWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW,QVXPWKHROLJDUFKV
had to become servants, as opposed to competitors, or opponents of the regime 
(Lavelle, 2004). 
Now consider what happens when private decision-makers become leaders 
LQWKH6WDFNHOEHUJJDPH)LJ%\JDLQLQJWKH¿UVWPRYHUDGYDQWDJHSULYDWH
agents can attain their maximum payoff of m ((1– s)ʌ /n E\ FKRRVLQJ WKH³QRW
FRQIRUP´RSWLRQ NQRZLQJ WKDW LI WKHVWDWHSXQLVKHV WKHP LQ WKLV SHULRG LW UH-
FHLYHV WKHVPDOOHVWSUR¿WJHQHUDWHGE\ WKHJDPH7KLV VWUDWHJ\ OHDYHV WKHVWDWH
with a much reduced payoff of Įʌ, and represents a weakened government, which 
LVIUHTXHQWO\YXOQHUDEOHWRROLJDUFKSRZHUZDUVIRUH[DPSOHWKHQRWRULRXV³ORDQV
IRUVKDUHV´VFKHPHRIWKHPLGV
From the outcomes produced above, one can see that in the absence of strong 
property rights, it is socially optimal to re-establish the state as the market leader , 
Fig. 2.$SULYDWHGHFLVLRQPDNHUDFWVDVWKH6WDFNHOEHUJOHDGHULQDWZRSOD\HUJDPH 
between the state and a private decision-maker.
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because such organizational structure can better secure long-term investment 
funds. The government is able to place constraints on private decision-makers 
and thereby limit their abilities to engage in short-term predatory behavior by 
forcing them to conform to state’s anti-expropriation policies. This approach en-
ables the state to obtain its maximum attainable payoff (which also corresponds 
WRWKHVRFLDORSWLPXPDQGLWDOVRHQDEOHVSULYDWHDJHQWVWRPDNHDSUR¿W
3.2. The co-partnership between the state and private investors
:KLOHWKH6WDFNHOEHUJJDPHVWUDWHJ\EHWZHHQWKHVWDWHDQGSULYDWHGHFLVLRQ
makers ameliorates rent-seeking, one must also draw attention to c, or cost of 
implementing punishment. The government has to spend substantial resources 
to monitor the behavior of private decision-makers, as well as absorb the cost of 
investment scandals. For instance, there were numerous reports referring to con-
WLQXRXVJRYHUQPHQWLQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKHRSHUDWLRQVRISULYDWHFRPSDQLHV%XFN
2003), especially if these companies belonged to industries of national interest, 
VXFKDVWKHRLOVHFWRU)LQRQDQG/RFDWHOOL6XFKSUDFWLFHVFXOPLQDWHGLQ
internationally-condemned business environment, which deterred global inves-
WRUVIURPHQWHULQJWKH5XVVLDQPDUNHW+DQVRQ0F)DXODQG6WRQHU:HLVV
DUJXHGWKDWWKHUHJLPHIRFXVHGRQ³UROOLQJEDFNGHPRFUDWLFJDLQV´LQH[-
change for stability and growth.
7KHUHIRUH DV WKHSXQLVKPHQW VWUDWHJ\PD\QRW DOZD\VEH WKHPRVW HI¿FLHQW
policy, I argue that the central state often opted to create a direct partnership with 
SULYDWHLQYHVWRUV%\DFTXLULQJDODUJHSURSRUWLRQRIFDSLWDOLQPDQ\HQWHUSULVHV
WKHJRYHUQPHQWEHFDPHDPDMRUSDUWQHULQ¿UPGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVVDQGKDG
WKHDXWKRULW\WREORFNSUHGDWRU\EHKDYLRU1LNRQRY7RPSVRQ
From the theoretical perspective, Russia’s choice of economic organization is 
a response to the existence of severe transaction costs and to subsequent miti-
gation of contractual incompleteness in the absence of a strong property rights 
V\VWHP ,Q WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\PDQ\ ODUJH¿[HG LQYHVWPHQW SURMHFWVZKLFK
KDYH VLJQL¿FDQW VXQN FRVWV DQG FDQ EH GH¿QHG DV ORQJWHUP WR PDWXULW\ DUH
XQGHUWDNHQ ,Q WKHDEVHQFHRIDZHOOGH¿QHGOHJDOFRGHRUVRPHHIIHFWLYHVXE-
stitute, one ex ante expects high hold-up costs, and high hold-up costs lead to 
a high level of underinvestment, particularly in strategic economic sectors, which 
DUHDOVRFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\KLJKDVVHWVSHFL¿FLW\.OHLQHWDO:LOOLDPVRQ
:KLOHLWLVEHOLHYHGWKDW5XVVLDQ¿UPVKDYHEHQH¿WHGIURPVWULQJHQWFRU-
SRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHUHIRUPV<DNRYOHY/D]DUHYDHWDORQHFDQQRW
expect a rapid emergence of an appropriate legal system, which can assure pri-
YDWH LQYHVWRUV RI WKHLU H[SHFWHG UHWXUQV 6XEVHTXHQWO\ LQPRUH YXOQHUDEOH LQ
dustries a second-best corporate governance mechanism has arisen in the form 
of the state–private co-ownership system, which can act to monitor the behavior 
of corporate insiders and constrain their wealth tunneling objectives until Russia 
develops a secure property rights system. 
*UR]RYVNL\  DQG+DQVRQ  VKRZHG WKDW WKHSROLWLFDO UHJLPHRI
the 2000s eschewed renationalization of enterprises and instead increased its 
stake in corporate equity from 20 percent to just under 40 percent between 2003 
DQG6SUHQJHUDOVRGUHZDWWHQWLRQWRVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVHGJRYHUQ-
ment control over the country’s largest enterprises. Above all, the state targeted 
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HQHUJ\ VHFWRU ¿UPV DV5XVVLD¶V HFRQRPLF UHYLYDO GHSHQGHG RQ WKHDELOLW\ RI
the state to collect energy sector rents, while offering investors their expect-
HG UDWH RI UHWXUQ %XWW HW DO  )RUHLJQ LQYHVWRUVZHUH DOVR HQFRXUDJHG
WR IRUPSDUWQHUVKLSVZLWK WKHVWDWH (URFKNLQH DQG(URFKNLQH +DQVRQ
2009). It is reported that over 40 percent of the 500 points Russian stock market 
growth during the 2000–2006 period was attributed to two major energy com-
SDQLHVQDPHO\*D]SURPDQG5RVQHIWZKLFKLQWURGXFHGSDUWQHUVKLSVEHWZHHQ
WKHVWDWH DQGSULYDWH LQYHVWRUV +DUULV +RZHYHU7RPSVRQ  DQG
9DQWHHYD DQG+LFNVRQ ZHQW D OLWWOH IXUWKHU E\ VKRZLQJ WKDW VWDWH SDU-
ticipation also increased in industries such as utility, metallurgy and mining, 
transport and manufacturing (see Table 2 for number of co-partnerships among 
576OLVWHG¿UPV7KHVHLQGXVWULHVDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKODUJHVXQNFRVWVDQGKLJK
DVVHW VSHFL¿FLW\ DQG LQ WKHDEVHQFH RI DZHOOGH¿QHG SURSHUW\ ULJKWV V\VWHP
DUHVXEMHFW WRVLJQL¿FDQWKROGXSFRVWV9DQWHHYDDQG+LFNVRQDOVRUH-
ported that the implemented state-private co-partnership had a positive effect on 
company long-term performance, indicating that this strategy may have been 
less costly and more effective than simply monitoring and punishing private 
decision-makers. Chernykh (2005) demonstrated similar results and argued that 
the state’s key objective was to regain control over strategic enterprises in order 
WRPLQLPL]HZHDOWKWXQQHOLQJDQGQRWDFFRUGLQJWRDSRSXODUEHOLHIWR³FKHUU\
SLFN´PRVWSUR¿WDEOH¿UPV&KHUQ\NK,QRWKHUZRUGVXQGHUWKHQHZUH-
gime, a partnership between investors and Kremlin was successful in increasing 
private investment from $11 billion in 2000 to $54 billion in 2005 (Treisman, 
ZKLOHFDSLWDO LQÀRZFRPSULVHGVHYHQSHUFHQWRI*'3LQ.XGULQ
DQG*XUYLFK
Table 2
6WDWHSULYDWHFRRZQHUVKLSDFURVVHLJKWLQGXVWULDOVHFWRUVGXULQJ±DQGWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIVWDWHSULYDWH
RZQHGHQWHUSULVHVUHODWLYHWRWKHRYHUDOOQXPEHURI¿UPVLQWKLVLQGXVWU\EDVHGRQ576OLVWHG¿UPV
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Utility 1

1

4

5

5

12

10

10

19

Energy 1

0

1

2

2

3

2

3

3

Metallurgy & Mining 0

1

1

2

2

2

3

3

5

Transport 2

2

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

Manufacturing 0

3

7

7

7



7

7

14

Communications 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

%DQNLQJ	6HUYLFHV 0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

Food & Retail 1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

Total 6 9 17 20 20 29 25 26 45
6RXUFHVanteeva (2012).
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4. Conclusion
Russia has a long-standing tradition of authoritarian government, where its 
business model came to rely on a strong governing role of the state. As is often 
postulated, the historical tendency in Russia for central and authoritarian eco-
nomic planning hampers the possibilities of any organic growth through the me-
dium of unfettered market forces. 
Evidence has shown that under a weak legal system, hierarchical groups tend 
to adopt a short-term wealth tunneling strategy, which leads to economic stagna-
WLRQ7KLVZDV UHDI¿UPHGGXULQJ WKHSULYDWL]DWLRQ LQLWLDWLYHZKHUHE\:HVWHUQ
style governing institutions failed to emerge and the new elites siphoned off na-
tional resources. 
The subsequent policy was a response to laissez-faire approach of the 1990s, 
which culminated in economic collapse, institutional chaos, and a weak state. 
The administration focused on reigning in the oligarchs and centralizing feder-
DOVWUXFWXUHE\FUHDWLQJVXSHUUHJLRQVDQGDSSRLQWLQJSHUVRQDOWUXVWHGRI¿FLDOV
to ensure that the state’s interests are met. Unsurprisingly, these goals came at 
the expense of the development of more democratic institutions. 
7KLVSDSHUVKRZVKRZGXULQJ3XWLQ¶V¿UVWWHQXUHWKHVWDWHLPSOHPHQWHGVHYHUH
punishment strategy on private decision-makers, who sought to form competing 
KLHUDUFKLHVDQGXVHWKHLUQHZIRXQGLQÀXHQFHWRXVXUSZHDOWK6LJQL¿FDQWO\LWLV
also important to observe the formation of a substitute monitoring mechanism, 
where the state aspired to form a direct co-partnership with private investors to 
promote long-run economic growth.
Putin’s strategies to rebuild the Russian state were not dissimilar to the ap-
proaches adopted in the 19th century France and Japan, which centralized 
power, implementing a top-down control method and displacing the elites. 
)XUWKHUPRUHPDQ\DXWKRUVHJ+DVKLP/HYLWVN\DQG:D\QRWH
that transition economies may not necessarily remain unstable until they imple-
ment democratic institutions, and that their stable state may, in fact, represent 
D QRQGHPRFUDF\ +RZHYHU WKHVWDELOLW\ ZLOO XOWLPDWHO\ GHSHQG RQ ZKHWKHU
the state will successfully manage Russia’s faltering economy in the wake of 
RLO SULFH GHFOLQH DQG VLJQL¿FDQW FDSLWDO ÀLJKW7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQW RI D VHFXUH
property rights system may still be the necessary prerequisite for the country’s 
long-term development. 
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